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Article 4

CHARACTERIZATION IN RELIGIOUS PROPERTY TAX-EXEMPTION: WHAT IS RELIGION? - A SURVEY AND A PROPOSED
DEFINITION AND APPROACH
John R. Brancato*
I. Introduction
One of the most common governmental practices among the states today
is the exemption of church property from real property taxation. Indeed,
throughout the history of America religious societies have been accorded this
tax-free status.' Only recently, however, have the taxing authorities been looking
askance at the practice. While the exemption is required or authorized by all
the state constitutions and/or tax codes,2 the local assessors and collectors are
applying far stricter rules for qualification.
Across the country, state and local taxing powers are putting the bite
on many properties owned, operated or otherwise affiliated with churches...
and other groups long considered exempt. As the costs of local government
continue to soar, these attempts to wring cash from the previously untaxed
seem certain to continue.3
Understandably, this crackdown is related largely to the rapid increase in
recent years of both the number and magnitude of the church exemptions.'
An increasing number of uncontroverted religious societies are taking advantage
of the exemption through the acquisition of new property. Similarly, more and
more borderline groups, claiming the magic status of "religion," are seeking to
rid themselves of the property tax burden.5 Clearly, strained relations and litigation seem to be indicated in the near future.6
In order to help characterize borderline groups, this article will survey the
present scope and policy of the law of tax-exemption and focus on the determina* A.B., Allegheny College, 1964; LL.B., Vanderbilt Univ. School of Law, 1967; member,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee Bars. The author is presently a Captain in the United States Air
Force, Judge Advocate General's Department.
1 C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 328-29 (1933).
2 For a collection of state constitutional and statutory provisions, see Van Alstyne, Tax
Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 461, 464 n. 15-23 (1959). Not included
therein are the provisions of Alaska and Hawaii: ALAs.A CONST. art. IX, § 4; HAWAI REv.
LAWS § 128-18 (Supp. 1965).
3 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1966, at 1, col. 6. See also, M. LARSON, TAx-EXEMPT
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY IN KEY AMERICAN CITIES 37-38 (1965).
4 In the latter part of 1964, Dr. Martin A. Larson was commissioned by Americans
United to analyze the tax records of certain cities in order to discover facts concerning taxexempt realty. He examined the records of Buffalo, Baltimore, Denver, and the District of
Columbia. By extrapolation he estimated that all taxable property in the United States was
worth about $850 billion and that $330 billion was tax-exempt. Of this, $79.5 billion worth
of property was estimated to belong to churches. Transcript, CBS Reports, The Business of
Religion 7a-8, Tuesday, June 18, 1968, 10:00 PM EDT. Other estimates of the value of taxexempt church property run from $40 to $100 billion. Id. at 7a.
5 See, e.g., note 83 infra.
6 While there is something less than a plethora of reported cases on the "twilight zone"
religions in the property tax field, it is suspected that the great majority of controversies have
heretofore been disposed of at the local administrative level.
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tion of what activities and beliefs will and should be characterized as "religion"'
for purposes of the exemption laws. Once a workable definition has been established, a tool to aid in its use will be submitted.
Any attempt to define religion involves the processes of inclusion and exclusion with respect to borderline beliefs. Moreover, once it has been decided
that a certain belief or activity constitutes religion generally, it is necessary to
determine whether it constitutes religion for the purpose of tax-exemption, and,
whether this distinction can or should be made. Generally, these processes will
be limited at least by the United States Constitution.' This task, then, will
involve, inter alia, the reconciliation of legislative intent with constitutional prescriptions and limitations.
II. The Exemption Laws
The religious property tax-exemption laws in the United States are of various types.' Generally, they are based either on ownership or on use, or a combination of ownership and use. As might be guessed, "ownership" statutes merely
require the property in question to be owned by a religious society in order to
be tax-exempt.' "Use" statutes require the property to be used by the society,
either exclusively" or primarily," for religious worship or purposes. 2 The
"hybrid" statutes require concurrent ownership and use by a religious society.'1
The scope of these statutes and constitutional provisions vary. Some states
limit the exemption to parsonages and church edifices only, while others exempt
all property which would qualify under the general enabling acts. The latter
commonly encompass all property used directly or indirectly for religious worship
or purposes.'
In addition to religious property exemptions, there are "catch-all" exemptions for charitable, educational, benevolent, literary, and other similar types of
7

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .

. .

. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 464.
9 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.02
(Supp. 1967); N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. These laws are worded rather simply; e.g., Minnesota's law provides:

All property described in this section to the extent herein limited shall be exempt from
taxation:

(5) All churches, church property, and houses of worship ....

10 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1' (West Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
137-1-3(6) (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 '(Supp. 1967); OHio Rzv. CODE ANN. §
5709.07 (Page 1954).
11 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(m) & (n) (1967).
12 Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 464 suggests that the use of the term "purposes" intimates
a broader exemption policy than does the use of the term "worship."
13 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-81(13), 12-88 (1958); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
59, § 5 (Supp. 1967); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9697(d) (Supp. 1966); N.Y. RzAL PROP. TAx §
4(20) (McKinney Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502 (Supp. 1967).
14 For a survey of different properties, such as the church itself, the church land, tangible
personalty, living quarters of clergy and personnel, see Van AIstyne, supra note 2 at 463-503.
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property. 5 Under these, a group which is not characterized as a religion may
receive an exemption. Qualifying for such an exemption, with the special problems it poses, 6 is beyond the scope of this article, which deals with qualifying only
for a "religious" exemption.
III. The Policy of the Exemption
Serious problems arise when a court attempts to define religion for any
purpose." However, that there is a practical necessity for the utilization of the
definitional process is virtually axiomatic, especially in the tax-exemption area.
Given this need for a workable definition of religion in tax-exemption,
there remains the necessity of examining the setting of the problem in order to
gain a proper appreciation of certain influential factors. This section and the
next consider the policy and justification of exempting religious societies from
the property tax. Also considered are omnipresent constitutional matters under
which the exemption operates.
Tax exemption of Christian churches originated in the Roman Empire
under the first Christian Emperor, Constantine. Noted for his efforts in desecularization, Constantine decreed the exemption after his conversion to Christianity in the early fourth century. 8 Little is known about the practice from that
time forward, except that it must have flourished and reached its zenith in the
very early days of the Holy Roman Empire, when church and state were apparently merged in their entirety. 9
In the New World, the English colonies granted exemptions to their own
established churches. "Church property . . . was exempted [in the colonies]

under the doctrine that it ceased to be under human control when it was devoted to God." 2
After the formation of the United States and the adoption of the first
amendment to the Constitution,2 ' however, the nation was ostensibly committed
to the separation of church and state, and the historical rationale of tax exemption was seemingly of no legitimate application. 2 Nevertheless, the practice con15 Id. at 496-97.
16 E.g., plaintiff, a non-profit corporation that operated a rest home for the elderly sought
an ad valorem exemption pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 16. Its property was not held
and used exclusively for either religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary, or charitable
purposes. Although it did not qualify as to any exemption singly, plaintiff argued that an
exemption should be granted because it qualified under a combination of some of the exemptions. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of the exemption:
'Since
taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception the Court is not
inclined to enlarge by construction, nor implication something that neither the
Legislature nor the framers of the [Florida] Constitution have not written in clear
and definite terms.'"
Presbyterian Homes of the Synod v. City of Bradenton, 190 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1966). See
also, Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 499-503.
17 See, e.g., Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less than Separation, 19 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 '(1951).
18 3 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (1950).
19 J. STRAYER, WESTERN EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 47-48 (1955).
20 Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L.
REv. 411, 416 (1934).
21 See note 7 supra.
22 While the limitations of the first amendment did not apply to the states until the
adoption and subsequent application of the fourteenth amendment, most states patterned their
bills of rights after the provisions of the federal document.
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tinued, and even flourished in the case of the Christian sects.2"
Today, there are four generally recognized justifications for exempting
property of religious institutions from taxation. The courts have looked to one
or more of them to uphold the exemption practice as non-violative of the restrictions of the first amendment.24 Generally, they can be phrased as follows:
1. If certain functions of the organization to be exempted were not
provided by some private institution or organization, the ultimate burden
of rendering them would fall upon the state.
2. The performance of these functions by these private groups actually
increases the capacity of other property to pay taxes, and this exemption
is no burden upon taxed property.
3. Being non-profit organizations, these groups possess no net income
and therefore no capacity to pay taxes."
4. The organizations or institutions are engaged in a service which is
beneficial to the public in general or to some class thereof, and for purely
humanitarian reasons the tax exemption should be allowed.
Of these four, the last is invoked most widely to support tax exemption of
churches today. As Professor Stimson states:
It should be recognized . .. that exemptions should not be granted merely
because of custom or tradition. Their justification today clearly must rest
upon the basis of the best interests of society as it now exists. This fact is
recognized by the courts when they attempt to justify the exemption of
church property, for instance, on the basis of moral influence rather than
on tradition and custom. The influence of churches upon the character of
various members of society is said to be sufficiently desirable to warrant
the removal of church property from the tax roll. Religious societies
devote their efforts and their property to the moral uplifting of society, in
most cases seeking no pecuniary profit for themselves. Should not the government
assist, to the extent of relieving them from the burden of taxa26
tion?
It seems highly unlikely that
discontinued. A recent poll shows
gress, and clergymen for exempting
the house itself, and its contents2

this deeply entrenched practice will ever be
very strong support among the public, Conthe land on which a house of worship stands,
There was also strong support for exempting

23

C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAw 328-30 (1933).
24 While the United States Supreme Court has never passed on the constitutionality of
the church exemption, it recently denied certiorari in a Maryland taxpayers' suit which contested the constitutionality of the practice. The Maryland Supreme Court, in upholding the
exemption law, said the purpose and effect of the church exemption is secular since churches
promote the general welfare of society. The benefit to religion was said to be merely incidental
and unavoidable. Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, 907, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 816 (1966).

25 P.

TAYLOR, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE

336 (3d ed. 1961).

26 Stimson, supra note 20, at 422.
27 When asked by a CBS poll if these things should be taxed, 80% of the public, 89% of
Congress, and 84% of the clergy answered in the negative. CBS Reports, supra note 4, at 11.
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other non-commercial property of religious institutions such as schools and community houses.2
IV. The Constitutional Perspective
No examination of the definitional process in tax exemption would be complete without a survey of the constitutional setting under which the exemption
practice functions.rs
At the outset, it is interesting to note that the framers of the Constitution
probably did not intend to deprive the Christian religion of its high status in
America, either directly or indirectly, by giving equal recognition to the nonChristian sects. This is stated in the lucid words of Mr. Justice Story:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the
amendment to it [the First Amendment]... the general, if not the universal
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement
from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of
conscience, and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all
religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation if not universal
indignation.
The real object of the amendment was . . . to exclude all rivalry
among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give rise to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government.30 [Footnote omitted.]
This proposition is merely academic for the purposes at hand, however,
since it is widely recognized that the Constitution, to be workable, must be given
interpretations geared to the times. "[T]he content of constitutional immunities
is not constant, but varies from age to age."31
What is the present scope of the first amendment's "free exercise" and
"establishment" clauses? While both clauses are made applicable to the states
through incorporation by the fourteenth amendment, 2 the free exercise clause
has generated a greater amount of litigation. 3
28 When asked if these things should be taxed, 65% of the public, 81% of the Congress,
and 73% of the clergy answered in the negative. CBS Reports, supra note 4, at 12.
29 See the Constitutional provisions set out in note 7 supra.
30 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 663-64
(3d ed. 1858). This seems to be the general understanding of the early courts as well. No
less a historical figure than New York's Chancellor Kent said in a blasphemy case:
Nor are we bound . . . to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like
attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the grand Lama ... we are a christian
people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and
not upon the doctrines or worships of those imposters. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns R.
290, 295 (N.Y. 1811). '(Emphasis added.)
31 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 82-83 (1921). Accord,
Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have thought . . . our use of the history
of their time must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices. . . . It is "a
constitution we are expounding," and our interpretation of the First Amendment
must necessarily be responsive to the much more highly charged nature of religious
questions in contemporary society. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 241 (1962) (concurring opinion, Brennan, J.)
32 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1939). Although there were earlier incorporation cases, Cantwell is the most explicit and most widely-cited case on this proposition.
33 See Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COLUM. L. Rv. 968
'(1949).
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Perhaps the most famous definitive statement on the free exercise clause
was made by Mr. Justice Miller iii one of the earliest cases arising under the
first amendment. In Watson v. Jones34 he stated:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief,
to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which
does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not
infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and
is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine ... is unquestioned.3 5

It was soon recognized, of course, that this "freedom to believe" cannot
always be coextensive with the "freedom to act." Although both freedoms are

contemplated by the free exercise clause, the latter type can never be as absolute
as the former. As Mr. Justice Field stated in upholding the convictions of certain
Mormons for bigamy and polygamy: "However free the exercise of religion may
be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with
reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of
punitive legislation.""8
The other face of the first amendment coin is the establishment clause,
sometimes referred to as the "no-establishment" clause. Of the two clauses, it is
doubtless the more significant with respect to tax-exemption of church property.
The question here is: Do you establish a church when you accord it the exemption? To answer this question it is necessary to pin-point what exactly is forbidden when "an establishment of religion" is put beyond the pale of the government's power. The leading case on this issue is the controversial decision of
Everson v. Board of Education."
In this case the defendant, the township board of education, had authorized
reimbursement to parents for money spent for transportation of their children to
school on public busses. Some of the money allocated was to reimburse transportation costs of children attending Catholic parochial schools. Plaintiff brought
a taxpayer's suit, challenging the validity of this action of the Board under the
first and fourteenth amendments. 8 The Supreme Court found that this state action
was analogous to police and fire protection for Catholic schools, and that it did
not support these schools." It found that the statute involved, as applied, did
"no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children,
regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools."4 In so holding, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the five-four majority,

34 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
35 Id. at 728-29.
36 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890). Some years earlier the constitutionality
of an act of Congress which made illegal- the Mormon religious practice of polygamy was sustained in the landmark case of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
37 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
38 Id. at 3-5.
39 Id. at 17-18.
40 Id. at 18.
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enunciated the "neutrality"'" doctrine which some commentators have criticized
as a basis for making agnosticism the state religion. In the words of Mr. Justice
Black:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws 4which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
3
religion over another.

This limitation involves two kinds of neutrality: that among religious sects
themselves, and that between, generically speaking, religion and nonreligion.
In light of this, can tax-exemption of religious sects really be unconstitutional? As
pointed out,44 the United States Supreme Court has never passed on this question,
but the courts that have done so have rested its constitutionality on policy
grounds, i.e, upholding it because of the public benefits conferred by religion on
society.4" There are two aspects to these public benefits: (1) Religion makes
men obey the law more readily by instilling morality in them ;4 s (2) religion carries
on many activities that would otherwise have to be carried on by the state. In the
most recent case on this subject, the Supreme Court of Maryland looked to the
second aspect to uphold the constitutionality of the exemption. The court
41 Id.
42 The argument is: To hold that government must be neutral by not preferring religion
over non-religion, is tantamount to suspending judgment on the question of God's existence,
which in turn is equivalent to adopting agnosticism as the official state "religion," as the
agnostic believes the existence of God to be unknowable. See Rice, The Meaning of "Religion" in the School Prayer Cases, 50 A.B.A.J. 1057 (1964), in which the author bases his
conclusions more on cases interpretative of Everson than on Everson itself, e.g., Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) and School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1962).
The question, however, seems to be whether something can be inferred from the court's
silence and neutrality, i.e., whether "unknown or unknowable" in law is equivalent to "unknown or unknowable" in fact or faith. That the latter is not within the purview of the
Everson line of decisions is affirmatively borne out in the opinion of the court in Schempp,
where it was said, "We agree of course that the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism! in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.'" School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 '(1962), quoting from Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952).
Perhaps the best answer to those critical of the neutrality doctrine was given by Mr. Justice
Jackson in his own characteristic fashion: "It is possible to hold a faith with enough confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not need to be decided and
collected by Caesar." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 324-25 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
43 Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
44 See note 24 supra.
45 E.g., Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed
sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); Murray v. Comptroller, 241
Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 93
R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962).
46 Cf.
While charity and education may be said to be
established in the policy of the
state, an establishment of religion is expressly prohibited both in the federal constitution and in most if not all the state constitutions. The strictly religious features of
church societies can therefore furnish no valid reason for this exemption. The only
rational ground remaining on which it can be justified is the benefit accruing to the
state through the influence exerted by the various churches on their members. The
religious and moral culture afforded by these societies is deemed to be beneficial to
the public, necessary to the advancement of civilization and the promotion of the
welfare of society.
Zollmann, Tax Exemptions of American Church Property, 14 MicH. L. REv. 646, 646-47
'(1916).
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reasoned that "if the present purpose and effect of the exemption is primarily
secular, and if those secular purposes could not reasonably be deemed achievable
benefit to religious organizations, the 'establishment' clause
without an incidental
47
is not violated."
In addition, the mere fact that tax-exemption of religious property is so
widespread and traditional is some indication of its constitutionality. "Certainly,
while the very universality of the practice of exempting church property from
taxation may not be a conclusive test of its constitutionality, it certainly is a sound
reason for courts to be extremely reluctant to take any steps to disturb such a
practice."48 (Emphasis omitted.)
Thus, what is important for present purposes is not whether the exemption
of church property is unconstitutional. Rather, the need is to determine what
constitutes religion under the neutrality doctrine.
V. Traditional Definitions of Religion
Undoubtedly, the most famous of all definitions of religion was expounded
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting in United States v. Maclntosh: "The
essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation." 9 This statement brings to the fore the essence
of the traditional, customary, and classical concept of religion - a reverence for
and obeisance to something higher than man, a quasi-personal supreme being
or supernatural force.
This theistic theme has had prominence throughout the history of American
jurisprudence. 0 An early New Hampshire case stated that "Religion, in the
strict sense of the word, is a personal concern. It is a matter between God and
every one of his rational creatures."5' (Emphasis added.) Other courts have
said the same thing, but in a broader sense. For example, in McMasters v.
State52 an Oklahoma court said that
'religion' has reference to man's relation to Divinity; to reverence, worship,
obedience, and submission to the mandates and precepts of supernatural
or superior beings. In its broadest sense it includes all forms of belief
in the existence of superior beings, exercising power over human beings by
5 3
volition, imposing rules of conduct with future rewards and punishments.
[Emphasis added.]
47

(1966).

Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, 907, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816

48 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394,
408 (1957). Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes: "[I]f a thing has been practised for two hundred years
by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).

49 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).

50 Jefferson, of course, invoked the aid of the "Creator" in the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, the preambles of all except six state constitutions contain references to
"God," "Almighty God," the "Supreme Being," or the "Supreme Ruler of the Universe." 3 A.
STOKES, supra note 16, at 567.
51 Muzzy v. Wilkins, Smith's N.H.R. 1, 11 (1803).
52 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922).
53 207 P. at 568. For an almost identical definition, see W. ToRP.y, JUDICAL DOCTaNES
OF RELIGIOUS RiGHTS IN AMERICA 3

'(1948).
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A more explicit definition can be found in Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church," where a lower New York court succinctly stated the substance of the traditional definition as follows:
Religion as generally accepted may be defined as a bond uniting man to
God and a virtue whose purpose is to render God the worship due to Him
as the source of all being and the principle of all government of things.55
An earlier United States case had said substantially the same thing: "The
term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and
to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his will.""
The foregoing definitions are termed "traditional" in that they all involve
the time-honored conception of theism as the sine qua non of religion in America.
As such, it can be said that tax exemption was granted to theistic sects only.
However, with the broadening of man's horizons in recent decades, a consequence largely of the increased emphasis on individual liberties, a dissatisfaction with traditionalism in the definitional process can be discerned. Moreover,
although there is no question that theistic religious societies fall within the terms
of the Everson neutrality doctrine,5 serious equal protection, establishment, and
free exercise questions would arise if the scope of that doctrine excluded all but
the theistic sects.
VI. Modern Definitions of Religion
In one of the earliest cases illustrating the dissatisfaction with the theistic
definition, it was said:
In its [religion's] primary sense (from religare, to rebind, to bind back),
it imports, as applied to moral questions, only a recognition of a conscientious duty to recall and obey restraining principles of conduct. In such sense
we suppose there is no atheist who will admit that he is without religion.5"
An even earlier Pennsylvania case rendered a similar, but more simplified
understanding of the concept: "[W]hat is religion but morality, with a sanction
drawn from a future state of rewards and punishments?"5
These representative statements introduce a new perception and insight into
religion - the willingness to characterize some non-theistic beliefs as religion.
This is important. The great non-theistic oriental religions such as Buddhism,
54 142 Misc. 894, 255 N.Y.S. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
55 Id. at 901, 255 N.Y.S. at 663.
56 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). That these traditional "legal" definitions
have reference to "non-legal reality" is borne out by the following dictionary passage: "[Religion is] . . . a personal awareness or conviction of the existence of a supreme being or of
supernatural powers or influences controlling one's own, humanity's or all nature's destiny."
WEBSTER'S THim NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1918

(1961) (unabridged).
57 See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
58 Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457, 512 (1881). See also, In re Knight's Estate, 159 Pa.
500, 28 A. 303 (1894); Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 803 (1896).
59 M'Allister v. Marshall, 6 Binn. 338, 350 (Pa. 1814).
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Confucianism and Taoism have flourished for centuries, but their legal , status
in America has never been a potentially prominent issue until recent times. 0
In the last analysis, the acceptance of non-theism as religion did not come
without compulsion at the highest level. In the famous case of Torcaso v.
Watkins,"1 a Maryland notary was denied his commission because he refused
to declare a belief in God, as required by the Maryland Constitution. In holding
this religious test unconstitutional, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,
said:
[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
.person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief
in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs. 2 [Emphasis added.]
This passage is extremely important because it suggests that there is such a
thing as religion "without God," and it does so on the constitutional level. As
such, the case expands the neutrality doctrine discussed above." Everson commanded neutrality between religions, and between religion and non-religion.
Assuming that religion was strictly the legal province of theism at the time of
Everson, that case would require neutrality between the different theistic sects
on the one hand and between theistic sects and non-theistic sects on the other.
But this latter type of neutrality was between religion and non-religion. Torcaso
changes this by classifying (or requiring to be classified) some non-theistic sects
as religion, thereby reordering the concepts within the neutrality doctrine."4
Because Torcaso does not explicitly hand down any test for determining
what kind of non-theistic beliefs can qualify as religion, it is not definitive in the
substantive sense. Indeed, nine years before Torcaso, Mr. Justice Black indirectly
expressed his unwillingness to propose such a test on the constitutional level:
"A state policy of aiding 'all religions' necessarily requires a governmental decision as to what constitutes 'a religion.' Thus is created a governmental power to
hinder certain religious beliefs by denying their character as such." 5
60 E.g., in 1965 there were 80 Buddhist churches in America, with a combined membership of 100,000 people. WoaL ALMANAC 148 (1967).
61 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

62 Id. at 495.
63
64

See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
Theoretically, there are now the following five types of neutrality (presupposing that all

theistic sects will be classified as religion):
1. Between theistic sects and other theistic sects;

2. Between theistic sects non-theistic, religious sects;
3. Between non-theistic, religious sects and other non-theistic, religious sects;
4.Between theistic sects and non-theistic non-religious sects; and
5. Between non-theistic, religious sects and non-theistic, non-religious sects.
All of these types fall within the terms of the Everson case. The first three pertain to the
neutrality between religions, and the latter two relate to neutrality between religion and nonreligion. Torcaso, then, merely changes the internal scope of Everson, by requiring an inclusion
of some forms of non-theism in the sphere of religion.
65 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952) (dissenting opinion). The Zorach

case issomewhat of an anomaly inmodern church-state law. It involved a "released-time"

statute which was upheld by the court. Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, criticized the decision
as violating the religion-non-religion neutrality requirement. Id. The importance of the
case for definitional purposes lies in the following statement of Mr. Justice Douglas, who
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Some commentators maintain that anything is now possible, that Torcaso
requires any bona fide belief to be given the legal status of religion, if the holder
of the belief says it is religion. 6 The argument is that this proposition always
was valid with respect to the free-exercise clause of the first amendment (subject,
of course, to the belief/conduct distinction illustrated by Davis v. Beason 6 );
and that Torcaso now makes it valid with respect to the establishment clause.
For purposes of tax-exemption, of course, the scope of the establishment
clause is of primary concern. When some religious sects are the victims of discrimination by the law, a question of establishing the favorably treated sects, in
violation of the neutrality doctrine, arises. This is not to de-emphasize too much
the importance of the free exercise clause, however. An exclusion of a religious
sect from the benefits of tax-exemption would almost certainly bring allegations
of interference with the free exercise of that sect's religion.6" More likely, however, such a case would be rested on the establishment clause and/or discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
The question, then, seems to be: Are the scopes of the free exercise and
establishment clauses coextensive? Torcaso, however, is like the oriental god that
looks in all directions; it is no aid whatsoever in answering this question. Indeed,
there even is doubt as to whether Torcaso is primarily a free exercise or an
establishment case.
It was previously concluded that Torcaso merely extended the internal
scope of the neutrality doctrine. As such the scopes of the two clauses are probably
now coextensive. If non-theism can be regarded as religion, the establishment
clause certainly steps up to the level of the free exercise clause. This is at least
true on the plane of possibility, for Torcaso merely changed the range of definition, without delineating the method of making that definition. Thus, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter could say one year later:
Within the discriminating phraseology of the First Amendment, distinction has been drawn between cases raising "establishment" and "free
exercise" questions. Any attempt to formulate a bright-line distinction is
bound to founder. In view of the competition among religious creeds,
whatever "establishes" one sect disadvantages another, and vice versa.6 9
The obvious and necessary answer to those who would dance the "Torcaso
Panic' is that a definition of religion for tax-exemption purposes, while controlled by the restrictions of the Constitution, need not be exploited by those
restrictions to the point of absurdity. In practice, if not theory, the distinction
wrote the opinion for the divided court: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id at 313. Whatever the problems presented by that statement
and the Zorach case in general, it seems that the Torcaso case limits Zorach to the peculiar
facts under which it was decided.
66 See e.g., Manning, The Douglas Concept of God in Government, 39 WAsu. L. Rav.
47, 66 (1964).
67 133 U.S. 333 (1890). See note 36, supra, and accompanying text.
68 Again, as to the constitutionality of the exemption practice, it was argued by two
defendants who had been permitted to intervene in Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 216
A.2d 897, 908, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966), that to tax churches for their property
would be violative of the free exercise clause, but the Maryland Court rested its decision on
other grounds. See note 24 supra.
69 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 463 (1961) (separate opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
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in scope, if any, between the two clauses is not overly significant for the purposes
at hand. No one would seriously argue that the characterizations given to
beliefs by the holder of those beliefs can alone be soundly determinative of
religion for valuable tax-exemptions. Indeed, most states grant the exemption
only to those groups which are formally organized and open to the general
public."' Moreover, a substantive definition is by its very nature limiting. For
example, the following definition, which contemplates both theism and nontheism, would probably exclude more beliefs and activities than it would include:
"Religions are systems of belief, practice, and organizationwhich shape an ethic
manifest in the behavior of their adherents." 1 (Emphasis added to "behavior.")
VII. Constitutional Shortcomings of the Definitional Process
A. The Ballard Limitation
In the last section it was seen that the fear instilled by the Torcaso requirement can be overcome by a judicious application of the limiting tool of definition.
Thus, in the case of a non-theistic belief, questions of violations of the first and
fourteenth amendments can be disposed of before they arise by depriving that
belief of the "religion" label. That label is the sine qua non of falling within
the purview of those amendments. But the use of such a process in the taxexemption area has a serious shortcoming. It gives the government a tremendous
weapon to exclude politically unfavored sects. One important limitation on such
power is the case of United States v. Ballard.2 The Ballards were proponents
of the "I Am" movement. One of them maintained that he was a "divine messenger" who saw and spoke with Jesus Christ, and who could heal those afflicted
with diseases and ailments. They were charged with using and conspiring to use
the mails to defraud, in connection with their solicitation of funds under the
above representations."
At the trial the district court charged the jury that the truth or falsity of
the representations was not at issue, but rather, the sole question for determination was whether the defendants held their beliefs honestly and in good faith.7
Losing their case, the defendants appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed in a 2-1 decision, on the ground that the charge to the jury was improper,
and that the truth or falsity of a belief was a competent question for jury determination."5 The case was brought to the United States Supreme Court, which
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the charge of the trial judge. Speaking for a divided court, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
It [freedom of religion] embraces the right to maintain theories of life
and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of
the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may
70 See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d
394, 414 "(1957) (dissenting opinion), where organization and openness are treated as general
common law requirements.
71 A DICTIONARY OF THE SocIAL SCmNCES 588 (J. Gould and W. Kolb eds. 1964).
72 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U. S. 187 (1946).
73 Id. at 79-80.

74 Id. at 81-82.
75 138 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1943).
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believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may
be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law.76
Thus, the government got its convictions because the Court wished to protect
the defendants' freedom of religion! Ballard, of course, was a "free exercise"
case, but its applicability to the definitional process is dear. Simply stated, the
truth or falsity of the content of a belief is not a proper subject for governmental
inquiry when that belief is prima facie religious in nature.77 Using the term
"prima facie religious in nature" seems to be the only way to explain the case
without becoming entrapped in a vicious circle. If the proposition is limited to
religious beliefs, there is no problem because the definitional process would be
complete, and the full protection of the first and fourteenth amendments would
follow. The question is not, however, whether a certain religion is deprived of
its constitutional immunities, but whether a certain belief is religious so that it
can be accorded these immunities."8
Applying the Ballard limitation to the tax-exemption area, whenever a
borderline sect claims an exemption, if the government cannot examine the truth
or falsity of the content of the belief, what can it do but accede to the claim? This
clearly indicates a need for a new method of characterizing beliefs, for an auxiliary
tool to be used in conjunction with a modern, substantive definition of religion.
B. The Non-Integrated Definition
Earlier it was seen that the exemption of church property from taxation is
not unconstitutional,"9 even though this practice involves an indirect subsidy to
religion. This proposition was grounded on the idea that churches perform
certain services beneficial to society, services that should be encouraged by granting the exemption rather than discouraged by levying the tax. Difficulty arises,
however, when a sect is classified as a religious society but is still not granted
the exemption because it does not fall within the policy of the exemption, i.e.,
when, in the government's judgment, the religion confers no public benefits.

76 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329
U.S. 187 (1946).
77 A belief which is religious in nature should not be confused with religion itself. As
used in this context, a belief is prima facie religious in nature when it is concerned with the
ultimate significance of human existence, i.e., when it fills the gap created by reason's inability
to grasp man's relation to the universe.
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of
relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe - a sense common to
men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. United States
v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 '(2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.).
The belief may or may not constitute religion depending on whether the other elements of
religion, if any, are satisfied. For an excellent in-depth discussion of the distinction between
religion and a religious belief, see Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious: United States
v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966).
78
It is interesting to note that, although the value of the case is particularly great with
respect to the characterizations to be given non-theistic beliefs, the Ballards were followers
of a theistic creed.
79 See note 24 supra.

[Vol. 44:60]

PROPERTY TAX-EXEMPTION

Perhaps the Black Muslims is or could be illustrative of such a sect. To deny
that group the benefit of tax-exemption, however, would certainly raise serious
constitutional questions. The tax authorities would probably be attacked with
the triple-edged sword of the equal protection,,'establishment, and free exercise
clauses.8" However, the problem would be further complicated if an exemption
is granted. Assuming the Black Muslims are not beneficial to society, their
property would be tax-exempt only because it is religious property. Yet, the
exemption cannot be given to religious-owned property solely because religion
is religion without violating the neutrality doctrine which is so firmly embedded
in modem Church-State law.8 An exemption of religious property must promote the general welfare.
A state cannot pass a law to aid one religion or all religions, but state action
to promote the general welfare of society, apart from any religious considerations, is valid, even though religious interests may be indirectly benefitted. If the primary purpose of the state action is to promote religion,
that action is in violation of the [First] Amendment, but if a statute furthers
both secular and religious ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to determine whether the state could reasonably have attained
the
82
secular end by means which do not further the promotion of religion.
This analytical look at the universal practice of exempting religious societies
from property tax seemingly requires such practice to be held unconstitutional,
regardless of how it is presently explained and justified. This is, however, a
surface dilemma which can be avoided by a judicious application of the definitional process.'
What is needed is an integrated definition of religion for the tax-exemption
area - one that encompasses not only the substance of religion but also the policy
for the exemption. Unless both of these elements are satisfied, a group should not
be characterized as a "religious" group under the exemption statutes, Retaining
the substantive part is indeed necessary to save the "religious" feature of the
exemption, and it also serves to exclude nonreligious, philosophical groups from
the benefits of tax-exemption. Incorporation, of the "policy" element into the
definition would favorably circumvent the constitutional compulsion, which would
otherwise have to include an "unconstitutional" group which does not promote
the general welfare.
One wonders how the dilemma discussed above has avoided the courts for
so long - or rather, how the courts have avoided the dilemma. Clearly, most
legislatures have not even attempted to define religion in their exemption statutes.
This monumental task has been left to the courts and the administrative agencies
of tax collection. Whether these authorities have been using an integrated or
a non-integrated definition is beyond the scope of this article. It is submitted,
however, that in the interest of expressly reconciling legislative intent with constitutional requirements, further action is necessary. An integrated definition
80 Query whether the following applies: "Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel just."
W. SHAKESPEARE, II HENRY VI, act iii, sc. 2, 1. 233. (T. Brooke ed. 1923).
81 See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
82 Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, 906, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816
(1966).
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NOTRE DAME LAWYERb

[October, 1968]

should either be added to each exemption statute or be expressly adopted by
courts and tax agencies.8"
VIII. An Integrated Definition
In considering an integrated definition of religion, some of the things considered by the courts in characterizing various beliefs and activities for purposes
of religious tax-exemptions will be examined. In this manner, the different elements of a proposed definition can be isolated and then synthesized.
In addition to the basic requirement of a moral belief which is prima facie
religious in nature, the following elements of an integrated definition are proposed:
1.) Openness to the general public
2.) Organization or society'
3.) Tenets and rituals
4.) Psychological commitment
5.) Moral practice of promoting the welfare of society.
It was previously" suggested that there must be some form of organization
in a religious sect, i.e., a society or association of members. In Mordecai F. Ham
Evangelistic Association v. Matthews," an ordained Protestant minister sought
a constitutional exemption87 for his alleged parsonage. His primary activity was the radio broadcasting of extra-denominational Christian evangelistic
messages and the publication of religious tracts. Reverend Ham's enterprise was
incorporated as a religious institution 8 and his parsonage owned by the corporation, but the Kentucky court upheld the denial of the exemption on the ground
that there was no religious "society" as required by the statute. The court conceded the existence of religious worship, but could not bring itself to characterize
the radio audience as "members" of Reverend Ham's essentially one-man operation.
In this case there is no question but what this appellant corporation
and the Reverend Mr. Ham are engaged in religious activities. The spread
83 This argument, of course, is rested on the premise that religion does not ipso facto
confer benefits. Throughout its history America has known several sects of dubious renown
for promoting the general social welfare. The Cult of the Black Mass has long proved to be
the antithesis of benevolence and compassion. More recently, the League of Spiritual
Discovery, a group of people who use and advocate the use of psychedelic drugs indicated its
intention to claim the religious tax exemption. Nashville Tennessean, Jan. 29, 1967, at 16,
col. 2. It is extremely doubtful that the League will be successful in light of the affirmance
of two convictions for illegal possession of marijuana against a pleaded defense of the free
exercise clause of the first amendment. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967);
State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966). For a discussion of these two cases,
see Note, Church-State: A Legal Survey---1966-68, 43 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 684, 778-80
(1968).
84 Openness and organization are probably required on policy grounds, i.e., that they,
along with the more important element of moral practice, are generative of the public benefits
on which the exemption practice is grounded.
85 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
86 300 Ky. 402, 189 S.W.2d 524 (1945).
87 KY. CONST. § 170.
88 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273.020 (1963).
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of the Christian religion has been most pronounced during periods of
fervent evangelism. But we are constrained to hold that the ownership is
lacking the element of a "society." As observed by the chancellor: "We
could hardly conceive of a society, as we understand it from the broader
term existing without some time or another there is a getting together.
The term society itself implies a getting together of its members, although
it is true persons may worship' God or even receive religious instructions
without getting together." The many contributors and the audiences may
be regarded as a kind of fellowship but not as a "society" within the meaning
of the Constitution. There is no communion, no unity, no society. This is
a one man organization; at least, as said by the chancellor, "Its whole operation is centered around one personality:' He is not a pastor and the
organization is not a church. He does not claim it to be. We are quite sure
that the appellant nor the individual it represents, is the type of religious
organization whose parsonage or residence of the minister is tax free. If
the property should be held exempt under these circumstances, the decision
would afford a facility or means for any individual engaged in religious
service to escape payment of taxes on his residence.89
This case illustrates the possibility of engaging in religious worship without being considered a religion for purposes of tax-exemption.
It should be noted that the fact of incorporation under a religious corporation law is of little aid in determining whether an organization qualifies for a
tax-exemption. The religious "society" or "church" has always been distinguished
from the "corporation." 90 The former is said to encompass the belief which constitutes religion, while the latter is concerned with thetemporal powers of the
organization, such as the holding of record title, etc. 1
Another previous suggestion was that, after a society has been established,
it must be open to the general public.92 This is implicit in the Connecticut
court's treatment of a Masonic organization in Masonic Building Association v.
Stamford."s Although it found that the Masonic organization was characterized
89 Mordecai F. Ham Evangelistic Ass'n v. Matthews, 300 Ky. 402, 189 S.W.2d 524,
528 (1945). See also People v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische Jehovah Gemeinde
Ungelinderter Augsburgische Confession, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N.E. 162 (1911):
While religion, in its broadest sense, includes all forms and phases of belief in the
existence of superior beings capable of exercising power over the human race, yet
in the common understanding and in its application to the people of this state it
means the formal recognition of God as members of societies and associations. As
applied to the uses of property, a religious purpose means a use of such property by
a religious society or body of persons as a stated place for public worship ....

at 136-37, 94 N.E. at 164.

Id.

90 C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 145 (1933); but cf. In re Long Island
Church of Aphrodite, 172 Misc. 668, 14 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1939), where the court
first denied, then approved on further hearing, the issuance of a certificate of incorporation
under the religious corporation law for a beauty worship sect. On the denial, the court said
Aphrodite was the Greek goddesss of love, fruitfulness and beauty. However, she was
deemed to possess other qualities, questionable in character, by reason of which there
has come into our language the word "aphrodisia" and other like words indicating
that the fame of the goddess is based on her alleged vices rather than her alleged
virtues. Keeping in mind the right of the incorporators to freedom of religious
belief, the justice is not required to give his approbation to a proposed religious corporation which might possibly tend to glorify qualities which are the very antithesis
of religion. Id. at 669, 14 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
91 W. TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 84 (1948).
92

93

See text accompanying note 70 supra.

119 Conn. 53, 174 A. 301 (1934).
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by benevolence and charity and that it inculcated "in its members a spirit of
worship of and reverence for the Deity,"94 the court affirmed a denial of the
exemption.95 In so doing, the court stated:
An organization which meets in secret, membership in which is
dependent in part at least on social considerations and the ends of which
are in part at least of a social nature, would not conform to . . . [the]
standards [of qualification for the religious exemption] .... 9
In re Peace Haven97 suggests the necessity for tenets and rituals. The society
involved was formed for the study of metaphysics. The property in question was
a retreat house where members could gather for study, meditation, and relaxation.
The court denied the exemption under an "ownership" statute,98 finding Peace
Haven to present all "the aspects of any ordinary country club, except that the
members of the former are said to profess a common interest in metaphysics."99
The court did, however, find the one characteristic clearly common to all religious groups: "It [the society] has no tenets, ritual, dogma or other characteristics of a religious organization except, possibly, the solicitation and receipt of
10 0
funds."
The psychological commitment element can be seen in Washington Ethical
Society v. District of Columbia,' one of the first cases to recognize non-theism
as religion for tax exemption purposes. The exemption was claimed under a
use statute by the Ethical Culture Movement, a group concerned with ethics
as the essence of religion. The members were free to believe in a supreme being
if they wished, but were not required to do so; their beliefs went to the relation
of man to the universe, in addition to the relation of man to man.' 0 ' There was
sufficient evidence to warrant the finding that the adherents of Ethical Culture
94 Id. at 56, 174 A. at 302.
95 In other jurisdictions exemptions have been granted to Masonic organizations under
statutes worded more broadly than Connecticut's. Id. at 62-63, 174 A. at 304.
96 Id. at 61, 174 A. at 304.
97 175 Misc. 753, 25 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
98 At the time in question, the applicable statute was N.Y. TAx LAW § 4(6).
99 In re Peace Haven, 175 Misc. 753, 755, 25 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
100 Id. at 755, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 977. Perhaps this characteristic should have been included
in the basic elements of the above definition.
101 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
102 Doctor David S. Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement, describes Ethical
Culture in the following terms.
Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove nor
disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric,
not theocentric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it,
must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive.
And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of
men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate the best in
their fellowmen. What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith
that it expresses itself in the human world as the power which inspires in men moral
purpose. D. MuzzEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 95 (1951)
Thus the "God" that we love is not the figure on the great white throne, but the
perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the
evil elements which retard its progress toward "the knowledge, love and practice
of the right." Id., at 98.
This description of ethics as religion was quoted by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 183 '(1965).
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were firmly and in good faith, committed to their movement as, a religion.'" The
Court of AppeAls for the District of Columbia considered the policy of the exemption and applied the religion label, declaring: that "also included in . . . [the
definition of religion] is the idea of 'devotion to some principle; strict fidelity
or faithfulness; conscientiousness, pious affecting or attachment.' 3)104
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,15 illustrating the element
of a moral practice promoting the general welfare of society, is perhaps the
greatest characterization case in the property tax-exemption area. Plaintiffs were
also non-theists. They believed that man contained within himself infinite goodness and should direct that quality to his fellow man. The purpose of the Fellowship was
"to establish and maintain a free fellowship for the study of human relationships from the viewpoint of religion, education and sociology; establishment and the propagation and nurture of the ideals of brotherhood of man,
and without any distinctive creed or religious formula; . . . a further
purpose of plaintiff . . . [was] to promote humanism by means of public
meetings, lectures, programs, study classes, publishing and distributing
literature and such other means as may be deemed practical
for the dis06
semination of constructive and progressive thought'"
The California District Court of Appeal upheld the exemption under a statute
requiring the property in question to be used "solely and exclusively for religious
worship."'0 7 In a lengthy opinion, the court explored the nature of religion and,
oddly enough, intimated that the humanist society was not engaged in religious
worship in the strict, traditional sense.'
The exemption was rested on policy
grounds, i.e., the benefits conferred on society by the Fellowship of Humanity
were similar to those conferred by more orthodox religious groups.' 9 In granting
the exemption to a group whose activities were admittedly "nonreligious""
in a strict sense the court employed a functional approach in characterizing that
group's activities.
IX. The Functional Approach to Moral Beliefs
To satisfy the statute in Fellowship it was necessary for the court to apply
the label of religion to what it considered a nonreligious group. To accomplish
this the functional approach was employed. Under this tool of definition, a
borderline sect is characterized as religion if its beliefs occupy the same position,
or serve the same function, in the lives of its adherents as the beliefs of an
accepted, orthodox religion occupy in the lives of its adherents, and if it
249 F.2d 127, 128-29 (D.C. Cir.

103

Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia,

104
105
106

Id. at 129.
153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
315 P.2d at 398.

108

CAL. Col ST. art. XIII, § 1/a (Supp. 1967).
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394,
(1957). It was carefully pointed out, however, that secular humanism is recognized

1957).
107

400-01

as a religion by the Unitarians. 315 P.2d at 405.
109 315 P.2d at 409-10.
110 Id.
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conducts itself in a way a traditional religious group conducts itself" i.e., if it
satisfies the above-mentioned elements of the substantive definition of religion.
This is a factual inquiry, capable of being determined by triers of fact.1' 2 The
content of the belief itself, however, is not a proper subject for inquiry.
Under this test the belief or nonbelief in a Supreme Being is a false
factor. The only way the state can determine the existence or nonexistence
of "religious worship" is to approach the problem objectively. It is not permitted to test [the] validity of, or to compare beliefs. This simply means
that "religion" fills a void that exists in the lives of most men. Regardless
of why a particular belief suffices, as long as it serves this purpose, it must
be accorded the same status of an orthodox religious belief. Of course, the

belief cannot violate the laws or morals of the community, but subject to
this limitation,
the content of the belief is not a matter of governmental
3

concern."

Thus, the Ballard limitation" 4 is an essential element of this approach.
The court found that the activities of the Fellowship were analogous to
the activities, that they served the same place in the lives of its members, and
that they occupied the same place in society as the activities of traditionally
recognized churches." 5 Since the Fellowship was like a religion, the court felt
constitutionally compelled by the neutrality doctrine to grant the exemption.
If the words "religious worship" are given a narrow limited meaning,
so as to require a belief in and adoration of a Supreme Being, then grave
doubts would exist as to the constitutionality of the section. On the other
hand, a definition which emphasizes the "non-religious" facets of the conduct of respondent will serve to sustain the constitutionality of the section.
Our interpretation of the tax-exemption provision must be as broad as is
reasonably necessary to uphold it. If we limit the exemption to those who
advocate theism then it is quite possible that the Supreme Court of the
United States may hold that such an interpretation encourages particular
religious doctrines and practices and thus violates the division between
church and state. Theism is a concept which is peculiar to religious theory
and practice in the technical sense. It is not a feature common to those
advantages gained by the state and supportable by it, through the activities

of private educational and charitable institutions. The problem can be
reduced to a simple formula. If the state cannot constitutionally subsidize
religion under the First Amendment, then it cannot subsidize theism. If
the state can constitutionally subsidize those functions of religious groups
111 Id. at 406.
112 Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). In this case, in employing
the functional approach in determining conscientious objector status, the Supreme Court
stated:
But we hasten to emphasize that while the "truth" of a belief is not open to

question, there remains the significant question whether it is "truly held." This is
the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of
course, a question of fact-a prime consideration to the validity of every claim
for exemption as a conscientious objector.
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394, 406
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(1957).
114 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187
(1946). See text accompanying notes 72-78, supra.
115 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394,
409 (1957).
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which are not related to "religion" in its narrow sense, then it must subsidize those nontheistic groups which perform the same functions. The
First Amendment precludes a classification based on them."1 6 [Emphasis
added.]
It is submitted that the court, while correct in granting the exemption,
should not have done so without labelling the Fellowship as a religion. This
could raise a problem. There is no constitutional compulsion to grant an exemption to a non-religion despite the neutrality doctrine. True, it is necessary to
justify the exemption practice on the public benefit theory, but that is merely
one factor in our two element integrated definition: (1) a religion which (2)
confers public benefits. Standing alone, the latter element should not be controlling. If it were - because of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment -there
could be no religious exemption at all, since any group
conferring public benefits would be entitled to the same exemption as that
afforded a church. Any such equal protection problem is avoided by characterizing a group that is afforded an exemption as a "religion" through employment
of a modem definition of religion and the functional approach.
X. Summary and Conclusion
Since certain religious property is exempted from the property taxes of
all the states, it is necessary to determine what types of activity will be characterized as religion, so that these tax laws may be expeditiously administered.
To qualify as a "religion" in tax-exemption, the following substantive elements should be established:
1. Moral beliefs which are prima facie religious in nature.
2. A psychological commitment to those beliefs on the part of its
members.
3. Tenets and rituals concerning those beliefs.
4. A moral practice manifest in the lives of the believers, resulting
from that commitment.
5. A formal organization or "society" of the believers, which is nonsecret and open to the public.
This is an integrated definition which encompasses both the essence of
religion and the policy underlying the practice of tax exemption, providing the
element of "moral practice" is defined in terms of the public-benefit theory.
The definition contemplates both theistic and nontheistic beliefs.
Whenever it is difficult to determine fairly whether all elements of the "model" definition have been established by a group claiming the exemption, it is necessary to complement this process with what can be termed the "functional approach." By this test, triers of fact ascertain whether the moral belief in question
occupies a position in the lives of its adherents similar to the position occupied
by the orthodox beliefs in the lives of orthodox believers. If these findings are
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in the affirmative, the exemption should be allowed providing all the elements
of the substantive definition can then be established.
This definition and approach should be helpful in characterizing new
groups seeking property tax exemptions on the grounds that they are religions.
On the one hand, a nontheistic group which benefits society could be granted
an exemption without any difficulty; yet, on the other hand, a theistic group
that does not promote the general welfare of society would not be granted a taxexemption.

